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Abstract 
 
Purpose - This paper is a note of success story of implementation of Asset Integrity 
Management System in PT. Chevron Pacific Indonesia 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach - PT. Chevron Pacific Indonesia (PT. CPI) is subsidiary of 
Chevron Corporation, 2nd world largest Oil & Gas Company.  To support its operation, a 
major number of equipment and facilities have been operating. After more than 30 years of 
operation, nowadays PT. CPI was entering mature phase of operation. Risk to keep operating 
the equipment and facility is growing up rapidly. The risk can affect to worker, environment, 
company’s reputation and profit, etc. Realized that condition, managing the integrity of these 
aging assets have become a critical attention to lower the risk. Starting in 2007, Chevron 
Corporate introduces an initiative called Asset Integrity Management System (AIMS) a part 
of Surface Equipment Reliability & Integrity Program (SERIP). Adopting a well-known 
“Swiss Cheese” concept, PT. CPI had been working to strengthen the all four basic 
safeguards concepts to prevent realisation of risk/hazard. Those four concepts are: 
1. Prevent,  
2. Detect,  
3. Control  
4. Mitigate 
In the early days, most of the efforts still focused on mitigation or curative action to battle 
common integrity’s enemies such as corrosions, erosions and mechanical failures. Recently, 
after few years of journey, the efforts slowly shifting from curative to preventive action along 
with latest rapid outgrowth of technology in the inspection/detection. 
 
Findings - Historical data record shows that by consistenly implementing AIMS Chevron 
succesfully reduced incident (oil spill) caused by integrity problems (corrosions, erosions and 
mechanical failures) from 212 events in early 2003 to be 14 events in late 2013. 
Implementation of AIMS have truly assisted PT. CPI to sustain world class company. 
 
Research limitations / implications:  Future research could consider benchmarking to other 
oil & gas companies and may cover a wider range of industry types. 
 
Original/Value – This paper presents an original and novel approach of Asset Integrity 
Management System (AIMS) to manage integrity of asset in Indonesia’s biggest oil & gas 
company PT. Chevron Pacific Indonesia. 
 
ICTOM 04 – The 4th International Conference on Technology and Operations Management 
 
371 
 
Key words: Asset Integrity Management System (AIMS), Surface Equipment Reliability & 
Integrity Program (SERIP). 
Research Type: Research paper 
 
1. Introduction 
Asset integrity nowadays is considered as one important element to improve productivity in 
oil and gas production facilities (production, refining, and distribution). In the development, 
asset integrity arises from technical issue (maintenance, inspection, engineering assessment) 
to a higher level of corporate management policy.  
Asset Integrity 
Asset Integrity is the ability of an asset to performs its required function effectively and 
efficiently while protecting health, safety environment, and the asset. 
Asset Integrity Management (AIMS)  
Asset Integrity Management System (AIMS) is the systematic implementation of activities 
such as inspection, tests and maintenance task necessary to ensure that important equipment 
will be suitable for intended application throughout its service life. 
Asset Integrity Management builds on existing Reliability Efforts  
• Focused on high consequence events - consequences of failure are unacceptable.   
• Applies a layer of rigor and governance to ensure the integrity program is being 
executed as planned and that variations from the plan are appropriately addressed. 
 
2. Historical Background: Lack of Asset Integrity 
2.1. Flexible Riser Failure 
Failure of the flexible riser caused a major fire and resulted in several fatalities.  Plugged vent 
ports located on the topside end of flexible riser led to a buildup in pressure inside the 
annulus, leading up to rupture to the outer sheath above the high tide water line.  Repairs to 
the riser were performed by an uncertified contractor to repair previous damage.  Corrosion 
of internal and external armor wires in the outer sheath location compromised the load carry 
capacity of the riser resulting in local bending, torsion loading, and local pipe elongation.  
Pipe elongation resulted in an increase in armor pitch, unlocking the pressure armor of the 
riser, followed by rupture of the pressure sheath and subsequent gas release until ignition 
occurred from an external source. 
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Figure 1. Flexible Riser Failure Incident 
 
2.2. Disaster in the North Sea 
The ill-maintained and overloaded North Sea oil rig, Piper Alpha, was destroyed in a fire 
which also killed scores of workers. Leaking gas on the Occidental Oil drilling platform 
ignited late in the evening of July 6, 1988, causing a devastating blaze in which 167 of 226 
men on board perished.  Many of the oil workers jumped 100ft (30m) into the sea to escape 
the fire and toxic fumes, despite being told their jump would almost certainly be fatal. Total 
insured loss was about £1.7 billion (US$3.4 billion). It is still the world’s worst-ever offshore 
oil disaster.  
The Cullen Enquiry was set up in November 1988 to establish the cause of the disaster. In 
November 1990, it concluded that the initial condensate leak was the result of maintenance 
work being carried out simultaneously on a pump and related safety valve. The enquiry was 
critical of Piper Alpha's operator, Occidental, which was found guilty of having inadequate 
maintenance and safety procedures.  
There are two (2) condensate pumps. Pump a was in repair (its pressure safety valve). PSVS 
take out and closed by blind flange – hand tightening). The working hour has ended, as usual 
the crew change shift, unfortunately ccommunication with next crew was not good enough 
there is no good hand over. Due to some reason the next crew started the pump with PSV and 
gas leak from PSV line. Initial explosion caused by leakage of natural gas condensate beneath 
the platform (due to un perfect work and communication of maintenance team – pump repair 
and related safety valve). It resulted ignition secondary oil fire and melting of upstream gas 
pipeline. 
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Figure 2. Piper Alpha Incident 
3. Reaserach Methodology 
 
3.1. AIMS Framework 
As a management process, AIMS process shall include policy development; organizing; 
planning and implementation; measuring performance; and audit and review. AIMS elements 
shall be in accordance to company Quality or HES Policies. Policies based AIMS has already 
been implemented by several oil and gas operators all over the world.  
 
Figure 3. Asset Integrity Management Process 
Asset Integrity Toolkit is a guideline to develop AIMS for offshore production facilities. It 
was published in 2006, developed by a joint industry project between UK Offshore Operators 
Association (UKOOA), Step Change in Safety, and The Health and Safety Executive UK.  
Asset Integrity Toolkit is also a health and safety based AIMS which is more comprehensive 
and measurable by several performance indicators that already known well in oil and gas 
industry. Asset Integrity Toolkit can be proposed as the basis for asset integrity audit for pre-
development of asset integrity management system. Asset Integrity Toolkit defines 32 
elements of AIMS into 6 six groups as follows: 
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1. Assurance and Verification; 
Facility Owner shall define safety critical element (SCE) within the facility. SCE is a 
term in Safety Case (UK Offshore Installation Safety Regulations SI 2005 No 3117) 
to refer to: 
- Parts of an installation and such of its plant or any part thereof, the failure of 
which could cause or contribute substantially to a major accident; or 
- A purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident. 
The assurance process is the duty holders responsibility to set out an assurance 
scheme that defines and manages the activities which ensure required performance 
standards of SCE are sustainable. While the verification process is the duty holders 
responsibility to develop verification scheme that provides the evidence to 
demonstrate the assurance scheme is operating effectively. Independent reports and 
comments shall be able to define clearly SCE list, assurance activities applied to SCE, 
and any failures and or anomalies are in communication with the duty holders 
2. Assessment/Control and Monitoring 
The process of assessment/control and monitoring should include the following key 
elements: 
- Rigorous risk assessment of potential major hazards and threats from plant 
equipment and operations to the personnel, the environment, and the asset; 
- Identification necessary mitigation and controls in order to lower each of the risks 
to a level which is As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP); 
- Recognition of which of these controls takes the form of SCE and assurance that 
the associated performance standards are continually maintained. Main issue in 
this element is engineering integrity. The duty holders should develop strategy to 
maintain the integrity of plant equipment against mechanical failure, fatigue, 
corrosion, throughout asset lifecycle.  
Activities ruled under this AIMS element are: Asset register (asset information 
system); Risk Assessment (risk based inspection); Mitigation Plan (repair, replace,re-
engineering); Inspection and monitoring (NDT, vibration analysis); and Integrity 
assessment (fitness for service, defect assessment). 
3. Competence 
Personnel with the required levels of competence should be supported by commitment 
of senior management. Duty holders should develop competence system that should: 
be able to verifiable by audit of training, recruitment process, formal assessment, 
provides demonstrable capability within their pre-defined and agreed job description, 
be in accordance with national or equivalent standards, cover third party contractors. 
4. Planning 
AIMS should be comprehensively planned for successful implementation. The 
planning and implementation of an Integrity Management System should includes: 
- Processes definition required to manage the integrity of asset; 
- Resources and Responsibility Allocation; 
- Identification performance against the plan; 
- Identification SCE should be included; 
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- Identification business element should be included; and 
- Effective prioritization of activities 
5. Maintenance Management System 
Maintenance Management System (MMS) provides the process for managed and 
control of maintenance program including set of maintenance task and their 
schedules. Target object of MMS include the following: 
- Maintaining the condition, functionality, operability of equipments; 
- Reducing failure incidence or mean time between failures, downtime after failures 
or mean time to repair; 
- Reducing critical incidents or near miss accidents; 
6. Quality and Audit 
Quality management and audit should be integrated and aligned in every process 
embedded in every aspects of asset integrity management through out six lifecycle 
stages. Quality and audit system as to senior management framework to guide 
organization toward performance improvement can encompass the four C’s of control 
(defined roles and responsibilities), communication (clear reporting and record 
keeping), competence (training and supervision), and co-operation (interface 
management). 
 
Figure 4. AIMS Framework 
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3.2. Asset Integrity Principles - Swiss Cheese Model 
Asset Integrity principles adopt the well-known “Swiss Cheese Model”.  With some layers of 
protection, it is expected that we can prevent the incident happened. Each layer represents a 
safeguard. Several layers of protection must align or fail at the same time to permit a 
subsequent, severe or catastrophic incident.   
Consistent with the concept of putting ‘first things first’, Asset Integrity Management 
provides a level of focus and rigor on the most critical equipment.  The ‘Barrier Model’ 
introduces the concept of ‘layers of protection’ to prevent, detect, mitigate & control, and 
response & recovery to the impact of failures of assets. This approach requires that various 
processes and systems be in place to protect people, assets, and the environment from a 
known hazard.   
These “barriers” consist of 6 elements as follows: design, construction, and start-up 
processes; procedures, training and qualifications; process containment and functionality; 
warning devices; engineered safety devices; and safety equipment.   
 
Figure 5. AIMS Principle-Swiss Cheese Model 
 
 
Example Component of each barriers element are as follows: 
 
Design Standards, quality control, PSSR 
Procedure Training 
Qualification 
SOP, Safe work Practice, safety training 
Process Containment Equipment, structure, machinery, I & C 
system 
Warning devices Alarm, 
Engineered Safety Devices PSV, ESD, Interlock. 
Safety Equipment Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
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3.3. Intercorrelation AIMS to Other Corporate Process 
3.3.1. AIMS related to OE 
Correlation AIMS with Corporate Process called Operational Excellence Management 
System (OEMS) start from quote of Element 5, Reliability Expectations 5.1 – 5.7, which 
states: Organizations are expected to “Operate and maintain wells and facilities to ensure 
asset integrity and prevent incidents.”  
 
Figure 6. Chevron OEMS 
3.3.2. AIMS related to SERIP 
In PT. CPI, AIMS is a sub process of another bigger Chevron’s Process called Surface 
Equipment Reliability and Integrity Process (SERIP). AIMS is covered in Stages 3, 4 and 5. 
Until now, most Business Units are in SERIP stage 1 or 2. 
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Figure 7. Chevron SERIP 
 
The SERIP Asset Integrity Process only focuses on the last three (3) element barriers (i.e., 
process containment and functionality; warning devices; engineered safety devices; and 
safety equipment).  The first two (2) barriers (i.e., design, construction, and start-up 
processes; and procedures, training and qualification) are included in different process called 
Chevron Project Development and Execution Process (CPDEP). CPDEP process is out of 
scope in this paper. 
  
 
Figure 8. SERIP Process 
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3.3.3. AIMS related to Corporate Required Standard for Asset Integrity 
The Corporate Required Standard for Asset Integrity was issued in 2010 along with three 
other Corporate Standards (Operating Procedures, Codes & Standards, and Process Safety 
Information) to improve the definition of minimum corporate requirements and strengthen 
overall. AIMS tied also to corporate required standard of AI. 
Chevron Corporate Required Standard for Asset Integrity Issued January 2010 intented to be 
the correlation bridge and gaps filler, between AIMS and several Chevron process.  
Chevron Corporate Required Standard for Asset Integrity Issued January 2010 contains 6 
major areas as follows: 
 
Figure.9. Major Areas of Corporate Required Standard for Asset Integrity 
 
3.3.4. AIMS related to Tenets 
AIMS also tied to tenet operation. Some tenets that align with AIM are highlighted with the 
red color: there are 6  
tenets related with AIMS 
• The Tenets of Operation are based on two key principles: 
1. Do it safely or not at all. 
2. There is always time to do it right. 
 
• Tenets of Operation: 
1. Always operate within design and environmental limits. 
2. Always operate in a safe and controlled condition. 
3. Always ensure safety devices are in place and functioning. 
4. Always follow safe work practices and procedures. 
5. Always meet or exceed customer’s requirements. 
6. Always maintain integrity of dedicated systems.  
7. Always comply with all applicable rules and regulations. 
8. Always address abnormal conditions. 
9. Always follow written procedures for high-risk or unusual situations. 
10. Always involve the right people in decisions that affect procedures and equipment. 
A 
•Program Description 
B 
•Competencies, Qualifications, and 
Training 
C 
•Structures and Equipment Within the 
Asset Integrity Program 
D 
•Asset Integrity Plans 
E 
•Tasks and Deficiencies 
F 
•Data Collection, Analysis, and Metrics 
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3.3.5. Diagram of AIMS related to All Chevron Process 
As per described above, AIMS has strong correlation with all other Chevron Process 
(OEMS, SERIP, Tenets, Corporate Required Standard for Asset Integrity .  The 
correlation of can be figured out in a diagram as follows: 
 
 
Figure 10. Correlation AIMS with All other Chevron Process 
 
4. Research Finding in PT. CPI 
4.1  Chevron AIMS Shaping Plan 
- SERIP Stage 3 - AIM Phase 1 (2011-2013) 
Baseline procedures are applicable to the entire Asset Integrity Management System (AIMS). 
Specific procedures applicable to fixed equipment and critical structures.  Focus on 
equipment that prevents Health, Safety, Environment, or Asset consequences of 1 or 2 from 
being realized. 
- SERIP Stage 4 - AIM Phase 2 (2013-2015) 
Specific procedures applicable to machinery, electrical equipment and power systems, 
instrumentation and control systems, safety systems including fire fighting and fire 
suppression,  subsea systems/equipment, and floating systems .  Focus on equipment that 
prevents Health, Safety, Environment, or Asset consequences of 1 or 2 from being realized. 
- SERIP Stage 5 –AIM Phase 3 (2015+) 
Expanding the focus to all equipment, defining Technical Authorities, standardize methods, 
and establish mature Communities of Practice (COP).  Escalation/Governance only applies 
equipment that prevents Health, Safety, Environment, or Asset consequences of 1 or 2 from 
being realized. 
ICTOM 04 – The 4th International Conference on Technology and Operations Management 
 
381 
 
 
Figure 11. AIMS Roadmap 
 
4.2 Measuring AIMS Implementation in PT. CPI 
Measurement of AIMS implementation in PT. CPI is divided into two (2) metric types, as 
follows: 
1. Implementation Metrics 
- Percent of initial integrity analysis completed  
- Number of Integrity Critical Assets Identified  
- Percent of Integrity Critical Assets identified that have integrity plans in place 
2. Execution Metrics 
- Integrity Plan compliance – monthly metric 
 Percent compliance - Number of Integrity Critical tasks completed in a calendar 
month / number of Integrity Critical Tasks that were due in that month 
 Number of Integrity Critical Tasks that are past the due dates the Escalation 
process is required and average numbers of days the tasks are overdue. 
- Number of non-conformances opened in the month. 
- Average age of work orders generated against integrity critical tasks (validate we fix 
what we find in a timely manner). 
- Number of temporary repairs in place and average age of open temporary repairs. 
- Number of open items on the Integrity Issue Log. 
- Number of reported incidents on Integrity Critical Assets (monthly reporting with an 
annual total). 
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Figure 12. AIMS Metrics 
 
Above metric was measured through highlight activities as follows:: 
- Established IBU AIM Procedure Development with IBU Task Force Team 
- Complete initial integrity analysis for fixed equipment  & Structure 
- Complete  Integrity Plan (ITPM Planning & Scheduling) for Integrity Critical Equipment 
(IC1/IC2 Equipment) 
- Centralized Integrity Database Management system into AIM Software Visions Metegrity 
(IC1-2) 
- Implement Non Conformance Process for managing any deviation from Integrity Plans 
- Complete Integrity task procedures on ITPM Plan & define acceptance criteria 
- Tracking, Update, Monitoring & Evaluate AIM Program into SLS AIM Metrics for item 
below: 
• Integrity Plan compliance 
• NCR management & Integrity issue  
• Temporary repair monitoring 
• Inspection & Certification Program Monitoring 
• Inspection finding follow up monitoring 
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Figure 13. AIMS Detail Stage 3 Metric 
PT. CPI has successfully developed a comprehensive pipeline inspection datase for its asset 
as show in the figure below, consists of red category that indicates most criticality integrity, 
yellow indicates medium criticality integrity and green indicates acceptable integrity 
condition, as follows: 
- 4,127 anomaly spots indicate red category 
- 21,983 anomaly spots indicate yellow category 
- 140,080 anomaly spots indicate green category 
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Figure 14. Pipeline Inspection Database 
Historical data record shows that by consistenly implementing AIMS, PT. CPI succesfully 
reduced incident (oil spill) caused by integrity problems (corrosions, erosions and mechanical 
failures) from 212 events in early 2003 to be 14 events in late 2013.  
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Figure 15. Data tumpahan minyak (oil spill record) lebih dari 1 bbls 
 
5. Conclusions 
The key features of the AIMS program in PT. CPI are the detailed failure history, design 
reappraisal, practically balanced risk prioritization, focused inspection and extended 
verification. The methodology could if used as intended, provide the concerted effort to make 
a major difference in supporting deepwater developments, in particular where hazop, safety, 
environmental and financial margins are tight. 
The methodology will ensure that corrosion prevention and control is well addressed, and that 
practical fit for purpose solutions are planned, and less reactive further down the line. The 
AIMS process can be constructively applied to structures, pipelines, subsea developments, 
topsides facilities, specific equipment or can be directed at selective failure investigations or 
mechanisms. 
The principles apply to new and existing facilities, the strategy and matrix generation should 
focus attention to urgent and high risk areas of safety critical items only, thus streamlining 
effort. Close adherence to the loop will ensure that practical, theoretical and empirical 
judgments tend to converge with re-iteration. Ultimately sanctioning the target of zero 
corrosion surprises. Consistently implementation of AIMS have support PT. CPI to sustain its 
world class performance. 
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Figure 16. Asset Integrity State 
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